

- Key Note - **Sanitized Release**  
**Digital Forensics: Public**  
**Experiences from the Past,**  
**Issues from the Present**  
**and**  
**Challenges for the Future**

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# Agenda

- Introductions: who am I, where I work at?
- Entering the Digital Forensics age
- The past
- The present
- The Future
- Conclusions
- Contacts, Q&A

# Disclaimer

- The views expressed are those of the author and speaker and **do not necessary reflect** the views of UNICRI, ENISA and its PSG, neither those companies and security communities I'm working at and/or supporting.
- Registered brands belong to the owners.
- This presentation will not endorse any commercial products, while it may give out comments and feedbacks on some of them.





# Introductions





# Who am I?

## Raoul Chiesa

- Founder, Partner, **The Security Brokers**
- Principal, **CyberDefcon** UK
- Senior Advisor on Cybercrime at **UNICRI (United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research Institute)**
- PSG Member, **ENISA (Permanent Stakeholders Group, European Network & Information Security Agency)**
- Founder, Member of the Steering Committee and Technical Board, **CLUSIT (Italian Information Security Association)**
- Steering Committee, **AIP/OPSI**, Privacy & Security Observatory
- Board of Directors, **ISECOM**
- Board of Directors, **OWASP** Italian Chapter
- Founder, Owner, **@ Mediaservice.net**



# Some books I wrote, co-authored or helped out



RAOUL CHIESA • STEFANIA DUCCI • SILVIO CIAPPI

## PROFILING HACKERS

The Science of Criminal Profiling as  
Applied to the World of Hacking



GdL Cyber World OSN @ CASD, Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa - RAPPORTO 2012



OSSERVATORIO PER LA SICUREZZA NAZIONALE

Gruppo di Lavoro CyberWorld

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Aspetti Terminologici e Tecnologici



Rapporto 2012

Coordinatore: Raoul Chiesa, @ Mediaservice.net

# About UNICRI



## What is UNICRI?

**United Nations Interregional Crime & Justice Research Institute**

**UNICRI was established in 1967 and opened in 1968: it is one of the 5 global Research and Training Institutes of the United Nations which report to the UN Secretary General (UNICRI, INSTRAW, UNRISD, UNITAR, UNIDIR).**

**UNICRI's goal is to support countries worldwide in crime prevention and criminal justice.**

**UNICRI carries out applied research, training, technical cooperation and documentation / information activities**

**UNICRI disseminates information and maintains contacts with professionals and experts worldwide**

**Emerging Crimes Unit (ECU):** Organized Crime and Corruption, Counterfeiting, **Cybercrimes**, Trafficking in Human Beings, Youth, Drugs, Eco-Crime



## United Nations Training Campus in Turin, Italy



**unieri**  
advancing security, serving justice,  
building peace








# The United Nations System

## Principal Organs



**NOTES:** Solid lines from a Principal Organ indicate a direct reporting relationship; dashes indicate a non-subsidiary relationship.

<sup>1</sup> The UN Drug Control Programme is part of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

<sup>2</sup> UNRWA and UNIDIR report only to the GA.

<sup>3</sup> The United Nations Office, the United Nations Ombudsman's Office, and the Chief Information Technology Officer report directly to the Secretary-General.

<sup>4</sup> In an exceptional arrangement, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

<sup>5</sup> IAEA reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly (GA).

<sup>6</sup> The CTBT Prep Com and OPCW report to the GA.

<sup>7</sup> Specialized agencies are autonomous organizations working with the UN and each other through the coordinating machinery of the ECOSOC at the intergovernmental level, and through the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) at the inter-secretariat level.

<sup>8</sup> UNFIP is an autonomous trust fund operating under the leadership of the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General. UNDEF's advisory board recommends funding proposals for approval by the Secretary-General.

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# About ENISA

## What is ENISA?

- **E**uropean **N**etwork & **I**nformation **S**ecurity **A**gency
- ENISA is the **EU's response to security issues** of the European Union
- “Securing Europe's Information Society” is **our motto (27 Member States)**
- In order to accomplish our mission, we work with EU Institutions and Member States
- ENISA came into being following the adoption of **Regulation (EC) No 460/2004** of the **European Parliament** and of the **Council** on **10 March 2004**. Operations started on **September 2005**, after moving from Brussels to Crete, and with the arrival of staff that were recruited through **EU25-wide competitions** with candidates coming from **all over Europe**.
- ENISA is helping the **European Commission**, the **Member States** and the **business community** to **address, respond** and especially to **prevent** Network and Information Security problems.
- The Agency also **assists the European Commission** in the technical preparatory work for **updating and developing Community legislation** in the field of Network and Information Security.
- I'm a Member of ENISA's PSG – **Permanent Stakeholders Group**.








<http://www.enisa.europa.eu/media/news-items/enisa-has-held-the-first-meeting-of-its-new-permanent-stakeholders2019-group-on-thursday-13th-september-2012>





## CERTs in Europe






# Entering the Digital Forensics age



# What is Digital Forensics?


**Digital Forensics** is the science about how to **obtain, preserve, analyze** and **document** *digital evidences* from electronic devices such as: Servers and PCs, Tablets, PDAs, fax machines, digital cameras, iPods, Smartphones (Mobile Forensics) and all of those *storage devices*.





# DF Key Phases

Computer Forensics phases:



- **Identification, Collection and Acquisition;**
- **Preservation** (Chain of Custody);
- **Analysis:** extracting those data significant to the investigation;
- **Evidence Presentation:** it's the *final* and the *most important phase*, during which *not-experts are capable as well to understand the job wich has been done* (think about Lawyers, Prosecutors, Judges, etc...). It's a good practice to *write down a document (Report)* in which all of the gained data and its extracted results are analyzed and explained, step by step.

# DF Expert skills

- Very often people ask me “which skills a Digital Forensics Expert should have?”
- The answer is not just a single one!
- A DF **real** expert should be a mix of:
  - Academic background
  - System Administrator (on different Operating Systems: Microsoft Windows, Apple IOS, \*NIX, \*BSD, legacy systems – and as many Filesystems as you can!)
  - Network Security Expert
  - Law Enforcement Officer/Investigator
  - Incident Handling Expert
  - Hacker (Ethical!)
  - Curious
  - (sometimes) be a **lucky man**... (you’ll see this later)
  - Possibly not married 😊




# Digital Forensics in the Past





# The origins

- In the past ('80s, '90s), DF was nearly an unknown science.
- The reason was very simple: computer “incidents” (anomalies, frauds, hacks) were just not so common!
- Among the very first DF analysis we can find the world-famous one by **Clifford Stoll** as reported in the book **The Cuckoo's Egg** (1989)



# Common issues (general view)

1. *Lack of knowledge*
2. *Law Enforcement behaviors*
3. *Costs*
4. *Lack of resources & Being “alone”*
5. A case study from 1995

# Common issues: lack of knowledge

- As described in the book, among the main issues, we can find out:
  - Lack of **methodologies** and standard approaches
  - Lack of **tools** (hardware, software)
  - **Evolution of the hardware** VS the available investigative resources at that time (i.e. modem interception and devices speed/baudrate)
  - Lack of **experts!**



# Common issues: Law Enforcement

- Seizes
  - Mousepads & monitors ?!?
  - Chain of Custody
- Lawyers, Public Prosecutors and Judges
  - How's the know-how of these actors in China nowadays?
- DF seen only on "computer crimes" cases (i.e. hacking)
  - Today DF can be applied to murders, kidnappings, child pornography, financial frauds, hacking incidents, insider trading, etc..
- No understanding of the basic terms (i.e. "hard drive", network, "Internet"...)
  - Nowadays (at least!) most people know what these words means (or they should...).

# Common issues: costs

- The costs have always been one of the main issues when dealing with DF.
  - HW devices and SW solutions were definitely not “cheap” (this is still a problem, tough)
  - Forensics Experts costs VS Court Trial salaries
    - In Italy the fee defined by the Law Court for a DF Expert is equal to EUR 30 per day – *travel expenses included!!* (1 EUR = 8.2 RMB -> 246 RMB)
    - Well.. We do not pretend to “become rich”, right?  
....While not even to loose money while working ☹

# Common issues: being alone

- Ahead of the Internet boom, there were no “forums” or “boards” where somebody could ask for help.
- DF experts were very few ones...
  - Each one with its own “little garden” (*not loving* to share knowledge and experiences)
- The main issue here was the lack of people with whom **compare experiences and troubles**
  - Not even speaking about tools and shell scripts sharing!



# Common issues: a case study (1995)

- On December 13<sup>th</sup>, 1995, the SCO (Central Operative Section of the National Police of Italy) entered at 6AM into an apartment in Turin, Italy.
- Since SCO's experience was related to Organized Crime (Mafia) and murders only, their knowledge of DF was equal to zero 😞

# Common issues: a case study (1995)

- They sized **everything**:
  - Personal Computers (OK)
  - Floppy disks (OK)
  - CD-ROMS (OK)
  - General HW: modems, cell phones (**not OK**, OK)
  - Paper agendas, notepads (OK)
  - Printouts (OK)
  - Mouse (**not OK**)
  - Mousepads (**not OK!!**)

# Common issues: a case study (1995)

- Furthermore, the DF analysis was executed as follows:
  - No Chain of Custody (**not OK**)
  - Manual signatures of the “tree” command printout (+1000 pages....) from the MS-DOS shell (**not OK**)
  - The “expert” hired from the Police (local University of Turin) *directly connected* the suspect’s hard drive (HP 5” ¼ 2 GB size) to its PC (**not OK**)
  - He wrote his report directly on the *suspect’s hard drive* (**not OK**)
  - Generally speaking, the whole DF analysis has been carried on in a “home-made” way -> very unprofessional!





# Digital Forensics in the Present

The Present

# DF today

- Today's Digital Forensics become a mix of issues and never-ending, unexpected "news"
  1. Host (Intel, Motorola, Mainframes, .....), Network, Mobile, GPS Navigator's Forensics
  2. "Weird" forensics (see next)
  3. Common issues (see later)
  4. Forensics Labs?
  5. Mobile Forensics
  6. Encryption
  7. A recent case study on Child Pornography & the Investigation Approach

# “Weird” DF

- During my career the DF teams I worked with encountered **a lot** of “weird” requests
  - Sun Solaris Enterprise 10000
  - VAX/VMS
  - Sony Playstation, XBOX
  - Cloud Forensics (we’ll speak about this later)
  - Web Applications-related hacking crimes



# Common issues

- There are a lot of issues when dealing with DF nowadays.
  - *Operating logistics* + geographically distributed DF teams (when executing seizure operations for/with the Law Enforcement)
  - Too many competitors VS few real experts (proofing a *effective and real* field experience)
  - The “Big 4” joined in (from financial fraud analysts to DF experts)
  - HW&SW **cannot** replace human brains (i.e. Encase *won't fix* all of your problems!; you **do not mandatory** need a write blocker device!!)
  - Needed HW&SW is (still) too expansive ☹

# Digital Forensics Lab(s)

- Building a DF lab means *technologies*, not products!
- Some people think that you *just can buy the right spare parts*. It's like a "shopping list":
  - ✓ A PC with Encase
  - ✓ "Some" Write Blockers
  - ✓ "Some" Terabytes
  - ✓ A software for mobile forensics + expansive CelleBrite UFED suitcase
  - ✓ That's it, ready to go!

# Digital Forensics Lab(s)

- This kind of approach it's not totally wrong, but ...
  - your operating system is your enemy
  - you are tied to the limits of your software
  - you could become an “expert” using Encase/”UTK/FTK”/whatever but you are lost outside of your “environment”

# Digital Forensics Lab(s)

## Operating system troubles

- Microsoft Windows is a **desktop** operating system (oh, really ?? ;)
- It tries to help you (I said “it tries”, blue screen, viruses, malware, DLLs troubles are just some “incidents”).
- It doesn’t care about “changing the evidence” (?), “reading external media”(??), “mounting read only”(???), and so on...
- If you choose Windows, your operating *is your first enemy*. First of all you have to *defend yourself from it*.
- You need specific software/hardware to do this.



# Digital Forensics Lab(s)

- You could have bought the best software in the world but the possible variations are TOO MANY, not mentioning our old friend Mr. Murphy ;)
  - Exotic architecture (just a simple AS/400 is enough sometimes)
  - Strange cases (not just those “easy-to-process” child pornographic file exchanges)
  - Software “ad hoc”
  - New technologies

# Digital Forensics Lab(s)

- **Investigations are becoming bigger and wider**
- Today's home user's hard drives are huge
- Sometimes you have to collect (and deeply analyze!) dozens of computers to reach the evidence of a crime
- Spreading data over dozens of external drives/server/whatever is dangerous and will slow down all your work
- Also, "some machines" linked up together won't be enough...

# Digital Forensics Lab(s)

- You must buy a back-end:
  - One or more server
  - You must upgrade your software to some sort of “enterprise edition”
  - You must choose between “having more servers but paying expensive licenses” or “saving license’s money and investing for a big server with an huge storage (SAN)”

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- So we tried to *plan a new approach* for a computer forensics lab
- Our guidelines were:
  - Opening to every kind of digital evidence
  - Opening to raw or well documented formats
  - Opening to new technologies
  - Open Source everywhere (where possible)
  - Cheap hardware
  - Security
  - Redundancy



# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- First, we looked for the technologies:
  - GNU/Linux
  - OpenAFS
  - Live-CD Linux distributions (i.e. DEFT from Italy, with a Chinese-language installation guide: download it!!! - <http://www.deftlinux.net/>)
  - Cheap Hardware

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- **GNU/Linux:**

- It's Unix: it's stable, it does what YOU want and not what *it wants*, it doesn't have wizards, witches, goblins or so on...
- It has the best filesystem support all over the world: it can mount more than 40 different filesystems, it supports more than 18 partition schemas
- It has the widest hardware support in the world, a very good one
- Oh, *it's free!*

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- It's true: you can't build a (**real**) computer forensics lab without a *huge* repository
- You have some choices
  - ✓ A big server with a SAN connected through a Fiber Channel or iSCSI
  - ✓ Some different servers

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- One big server with a SAN it's a good solution but has some drawbacks:
  - You have *only one machine*. If you need to work on many cases you can *exhaust its resources* if you are working “server side”
  - On the other hand if you work client side, *you could get old* while waiting for the files to transit on cable

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- The best solution should be having *some application servers* in the back-end *working directly on the data* (motherboard's bus are faster than networks)
- But there are some troubles:
  - If you split data on various server *it's hard to find* everything you need
  - It's hard to find *sharing protocol smart enough...*
    - NFS is horrible: it's too server oriented, it hasn't good security (NFS stands for "Not For Security" as I often love to remind to my colleagues ;)
    - SaMBa is too complex to administer, it has security problems, it doesn't scale up well, it's too tied up with Microsoft's humors...
- So, we went hunting for something that would eventually fit our (weird, very specific) needs 😊



# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- **OpenAFS is an amazing technology!**
- It's a unique network filesystem
  - It was born as academic project (1989!)
  - IBM owned it for 10 years
  - It's Open Source since 2001
  - It's used worldwide... Fortune 500, IBM, CERN, IHEPs, Universities... more than 250 public cells on the Internet...

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- OpenAFS is a global, federated, location independent open source storage system that provides pervasive data access from a broad range of heterogeneous devices scaling from handsets to super computers.

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- Broad platform support
- UNIX
  - MacOS 10.3-10.8, Solaris (Sparc and x86) 7-11 and OpenSolaris
  - AIX 5.1-5.3; HPUX 11.0, 11i, 11i v2, 11i v3; IRIX 6.5;
  - NetBSD, FreeBSD and OpenBSD (server only)
  - Linux 2.4 and 2.6 (through .24) kernels
  - Fedora Core 3-7, RHEL3-5, Debian and others
  - Microsoft Windows
    - 2000, XP, Server 2003, Vista, Server 2008 (32-bit and 64-bit)
- 250 Public Cells (and an increasing number of known private cells)
- Growing number of developers
- Partnerships with academic CS departments

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- **OpenAFS Strengths**
  - Unified named space (like “CIFS”: but it works ;-P)
  - WAN friendly
  - NAT capable
  - Authentication, Authorization, and Auditing
  - Change notifications
  - Distributed administration
  - High availability
  - Maintenance without downtime
  - Data consistency

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- A simple comparision (from 2009)

CRITERIA	OPENAFS	OPENAFS NOTES	LUSTRE	LUSTRE NOTES	NFS V4	NFS V4 NOTES
Single namespace	Yes	Defaults to /afs.	No	Planned for 1.8.	Extension	Not widely available.
Access Control	Directory	Clients support per-file ACLs	File	POSIX acls.	File	Superset of POSIX acls.
Distributed Architecture	Yes	Limited support for serving any (existing) filesystem.	Yes	Serve from up to 400 Object Storage Servers.	Yes	Can serve any filesystem.
Server platform support	Broad	Windows servers available but not supported	Linux	Solaris planned.	Broad	Hummingbird Maestro Windows Server
Volume Management	Yes	Transparent movement of	No	Online data migration	Extension	Not always available
Filesystem snapshots	Limited	Typically one "backup".	No	Planned for 3.0.	No	
Quotas	Yes	Granular to container ("volume") level.	Yes		No	Implemented by the backend.
POSIX Extended	No	Planned.	Yes		Yes	
Locking	Advisory	Whole file only.	Yes	No lockf/flock yet.	Yes	Mandatory and Advisory.
Transport	UDP IPv4	TCP support planned.	TCP IPv4		TCP	IPv6 not widely available.
Replication	Read-Only	Read-Write planned.	Local	RAID, not multi-server yet.	Extension	Not widely available.
Disconnected Mode	No	In progress	No	Planned for 1.8.	No	
Object Storage	No	Integration to begin soon.	Yes	That's largely the point!	Extension	In pNFS/NFS v4.1.
Location Transparency	Yes	Even cross-installation.	Yes	Location of Object Storage Servers is transparent.	No	Referrals offer limited functionality.
Security	Yes	56 bit fcrypt.	No	Planned for 1.8.	Yes	GSSAPI RPC.
Authentication	Yes	Kerberos 4 and Kerberos 5.	No	Kerberos support in Lustre	Yes	GSSAPI / Kerberos 5.
Multiplatform	Yes	Windows, Mac, Linux, most Unix variants.	No	Limited Windows pCIFS client. No Mac client yet.	Yes	Proprietary Windows client; Not in MacOS
Scalability	Yes	Thousands of clients per server in practice.	Yes	30000 clients per node.	Yes	
Performance	Moderate	No parallel access today. Limited by transport.	High	Optimized; Uses object-based storage.	Varies	pNFS extension, TCP allow good performance.
Open Source	Yes	IBM Public License V1.0.	Yes	GPL.	Available	Citi reference Implementation is GPL.
Commercial Support	Yes	Secure Endpoints, Sine Nomine Associates.	Yes	ClusterFS (now Sun).	Yes	Typically from OS vendor.



# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- **From a DF point of view:**
  - ✓ Building an HUGE repository with common hardware
  - ✓ Easy to find everything
  - ✓ Secure!
  - ✓ No downtime
  - ✓ Replication (see above)
  - ✓ Works well with BIG files
  - ✓ Works well with various architectures

# Building a Digital Forensics Lab

- We built **two different Labs** with OpenAFS:
  - Every single machine works both as a *OpenAFS node* and as an *analysis workstation*
  - Every single computer is reachable through **SSH**, also with graphics (X-Window)
  - *FreeNX* is another interesting technology:
    - Works well with low bandwidth
    - It has the concept of “suspension” and “detached session”, like *screen*

# Mobile Forensics

- As previously stated, Mobile Forensics is (already) the new DF's frontier.
- Reasons?
  - **Everyone has got a mobile phone!** (one at least)
    - Even poor countries / emerging ones (Africa, India, Brazil, etc..)
  - Today's mobile phones are just “fully-equipped PCs”:
    - Powerful CPUs, Internet access (broadband), Camera, “Keyboard”, Color display
  - Mobile phone users store important/critical information onto it:
    - Contacts/phone numbers
    - Personal picture/videos
    - E-banking
    - .....
  - Cybercrime easily realized how to heavily launch attacks towards them:
    - Zeus (and all of its variants)
    - Android , iPhone, Symbian, Windows CE, Windows Mobile malwares
    - .....

# Encryption

- No matter if we're speaking about standard PCs, tablets or Mobile Phones.... Encryption tools are (somehow) easily available to everyone.
- This is a true pain/big problem for DF experts...**just like “the Cloud”** (as Dr. Fred Cohen pointed out earlier)

## Case study: Child Pornography (and the Investigation Approach)

- Fighting Digital Pedophilia: **the “FDB” investigation case.**
- This case study is very interesting and **useful** because:
  - It shows the **power of combining** digital and real-life evidences
  - It shows the **power of a good investigation + Court trial strategy** by the General Attorney to solve the case
  - It has been **the first case in Italy** where a private DF lab and the Computer Crime Police Department (Italian Postal Police) worked together side-by-side



# Case study: the “FDB” investigation

# F.D.B.: SEXUAL TOURISM & CHILD ABUSE

The image displays a collage of four web browser screenshots related to the investigation of Franco De Barba (FDB), with large text overlaid across the center.

**Top Left Screenshot (espresso Local):** Shows a news article titled "Turismo sessuale, De Barba rischia 12 anni" (Sexual tourism, De Barba risks 12 years). The article discusses the investigation into De Barba's activities in Thailand and Cambodia, involving prostitution and child abuse.

**Top Right Screenshot (WIKIO.it):** Shows a news article titled "Trento: primo arresto in Italia per turismo sessuale" (Trento: first arrest in Italy for sexual tourism). The article reports on the arrest of De Barba in Trento, Italy, following a long investigation.

**Bottom Left Screenshot (Corriere della Sera):** Shows a news article titled "Turismo sessuale, primo arresto in Italia" (Sexual tourism, first arrest in Italy). The article details the arrest of De Barba and the ongoing investigation into his activities.

**Bottom Right Screenshot (Corriere della Sera):** Shows a news article titled "Turismo sessuale, primo arresto in Italia" (Sexual tourism, first arrest in Italy). The article details the arrest of De Barba and the ongoing investigation into his activities.

# WARNING

- This case study reports real-life evidences from a Digital Pedophilia investigation.
- Some slides will show images that could offend the audience's sensibility.
- If you do not want this, please get out of the room now. Thanks.
- **NOTE: *this case study will not be included in the public release of this presentation***

## Case study: the “FDB” investigation

- “FDB” is an Italian citizen, 55 years old, male.
- At this time he is jailed in Italy. The General Attorney obtained from to the Court a **grand total of 14 years of jail**. His crimes have been:
  - Children sexual abuse
  - Sexual Tourism (Italian law n. 28/2006)
  - Owning, spreading and creation of children pornography material

**SLIDES NOT AVAILABLE IN THE  
PUBLIC, SANITIZED RELEASE OF THIS  
KEY NOTE**



# Digital Forensics in the Future





# The Future

- The way I see the future of DF is...intriguing, while it gives me a lot to worry about!
  - *IT & TLC* will grow, grow and grow up: we're living in a *Digital World*, thus *heavily depending on the ICT*. And, **this will just get worse**.
  - *Cybercrime* has (somehow) *moved towards the "end-user"* (which is much easier to be exploited).
  - Security Incidents, financial frauds, hacks and IT attacks will *target the so-called "new technology"*.
  - (most of) these new technologies will **not** be designed with Security in mind!
  - DF will **not** always be ready on time.
  - **Laws** (and judges, lawyers, sometimes the law enforcement) **will not be ready** (always too late, very generalist approach, lack of budget, lack of trainings).
  - Just as history teach us, criminals will always be one step ahead ☹

# The Future

- There's nothing more I can state here, since I'm not Nostradamus 😊
- What I can say for sure is that DF Experts must invest their money into new technologies, keeping on to study, running security research on new scenarios, targets, actors.

# Conclusions

- DF is **now** a scientific Police Enforcement discipline
- DF is **not** useful only within IT crimes
- DF is **very useful** when its results are combined with real-life evidences
- Computers (let's say "IT"... ) are everywhere
- **Information & Experience's sharing is the key for success.**

# Q&A time

\* Thanks for your attention!  
\* 谢谢! 😊

**Questions? /有问题吗?**

# Contacts



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